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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
not to offices of private corporations. The court stated further, that
judgments rendered in civil actions in place of the writ of quo
warranto were not completely self-executing because the statute
provides that the usurper is not subject to contempt immediately
for failure to comply with the judgment, but only after a demand
had been made upon the usurper and after an order by the judge.
DONALD E. BJERTNESS.
ToRTs - RIGHT OF PRIVACY - APPLICATION AND SCOPE OF THE
RIGHT. - The right of privacy has been variously defined as the
'right to be let alone,"' to live a life of seclusion and to be free from
public scrutiny and comment,* to be protected from any wrongful
intrusion into one's private life which would outrage or cause
mental suffering, shame or humiliation,:' to be free from unauthor-
ized and unwarranted publicity, 4 and to live without one's name,
picture or statue being made public.5 The right of privacy grew
up as a defense against the modern techniques of transportation,
communication, and publication. It is the abuse of such techniques
which completely engulf an individual's personal life in the ab-
sence of legal remedy.6 As the techniques continue to improve, so
should the law progress.7 The development of the right of privacy
has had its difficulties because its need was not felt until after the
common law had become well settled. Many judges, trained to
rigidly apply the law as they found it, have in the past ignored the
underlying traditions of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and have re-
fused to recognize the right.' Even today a few judges maintain
that position, but they are a rapidly dwindling minority. 9
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
At common law the action for the invasion of privacy did not ex-
ist."9 Privacy, however, was protected in many instances, when it
could be associated with some other common law action such as
1. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
2. See Abenathy v. Thornton, 83 So.2d 235, (Ala. 1956).
3. See Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wash.2d 267, 177 P.2d
896 (1956).
4. See Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
5. See Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 192 S. C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940).
6. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 196 (1890).
7. Comment, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 507, 520.
8. Nizer The Right of Privacy, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 525, 559 (1940-41).
9. Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955); Yoeckel v.
Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
10. See Elmhurst v. Shoreham Hotel, 58 F. Supp. 484 (D. C. Cir. 1945) (dictum).
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defamation of character," violation of a property right,'- breach
of implied contract,'' or the breach of trust or confidential relation-
ship.' 4 The right of privacy as a separate action is of relatively
recent origin, having as perhaps its first proponents Warren and
Brandeis who advocated it in a Harvard Law Review Article.':
The first decision to allow a recovery for the invasion of privacy
a: an independent cause of action was rendered in 1881 in the case
ol DeMay v. Roberts,"; where the plaintiff was allowed to recover
against a physician because he allowed a non-professional, single
man to witness the birth of her child without her knowledge of the
fact that he was not a physician. Although the action alleged de-
ceit, it appears that the basis for it was public policy. The court
said: "It would be shocking to our sense of right, justice and
propriety to doubt even but that for such an act the law would
afford an ample remedy . . . the plaintiff had a legal right to the
privacy of her apartment at such a time, and the law secures to her
this right by requiring others to observe it, and to obstain from its
violation". 17
In 1902, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,'- the judges
of the New York Court of Appeals in a four to three decision re-
fused to enjoin the use of a living person's picture on advertising
posters. The reason for the court's decision was the lack of pre-
cedent, and the fear that recognition of the right of privacy would
result in a deluge of litigation and it would be impossible to pre-
vent the doctrine from being extended step by step until it em-
braced all sorts of absurdities. The court relied heavily on the fact
that such common law commentators as Blackstone and Kent had
never mentioned the action. The court further maintained that to
incorporate the doctrine in the law at this date would jeopardize
11. Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 526, 535 (1940-41).
12. Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G & Sm. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849). Ag'd I
Mac. & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849). (Queen Victoria and her consort made several
elchings for their own amusement and ordered a few additional copies to give to friends.
The people hired to do this made defendant obtain them, and proposed to publish and
exhibit them in a catalogue, and court granted an injunction against such, on the ground
that the Prince had a property right and also on the ground that there was a breach of
trust ).
13. Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch.Div. 345 (1888). (The defendant made un-
authorized copies of a photograph and sold the picture which was placed on Christmas
cards. The court granted relief based on the implied contract that the plaintiff only sat
for the one photograph. The obvious fallacy of this argument (implied contract) was point-
el out when the council reasoned, that a photograph taken without permission could be
used because there then would he no consideration to support a claim or contract).
14. See Note 12, supra.
15. See Note 1, supra.
16. 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881).
17. Id., at 148, 149.
18. 171 N. Y. .538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
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and upset the settled principles by which the profession and the
public had long been guided. The dissenting judges pointed out
that legal precedent was lacking but asserted that the law should
keep up with "the march of the arts and sciences"." This case
probably produced the most vigorous controversy concerning the
action that has arisen to date. The press so sharply attacked the
decision that one judge, disregarding judicial custom, wrote an
article defending the court's position.2  This journalistic upheaval
precipitated such unrest that the legislature of New York passed a
statute ' recognizing the right but limiting it to situations closely
resembling the facts presented in the Roberson case. The few states
that have followed the Roberson case base their decisions on the
contention that judicial fiat should not create law, but that it should
be done by the legislature.2
Prior to the New York legislation which recognized the right of
privacy many text writers had expressed the view that if the right
is to be recognized it cannot stand on legislation alone because
e" the rigidity of statutory language. They contend that the right of
privacy must have a flexible application so that it may meet the
facts and circumstances of each individual case encountered.2"
Despite this contention, New York's statute remains in effect.2-4
The first state to recognize the right independent of statute was
Georgia. In the case of Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life
Co.,-2 the court said that the fact that the common law was silent as
te the existence of the right did not mean that the right was non-
existent; further, if it could not be based on common law, it could
have as its basis natural law. The court added that the right was
implicit in the constitutional guarantees of liberty, stating that,
"'Liberty includes the right to live as one will . . . (and) . . . one
may desire to live a life of seclusion."2'  Thus Georgia wholly re-
19. Id. at 449.
20. See, O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 Col. L. Rev. 438 (1902).
21. N.Y. Civil Rights Law, §§ 50, 51 (1902).
22. Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594, 596 (1911), (dictum);
Prest v. Stein, 220 Wis. 354, 265 N.W. 85, 87 (1936), (dictum), (The defendant
manufactured, "Franklin D. Roosevelt Cigars", using both name and picture. The court
held that at common law the use of the name and portrait for advertising was not unlaw-
ful, which was not altered by statute. The defendant's action was poor taste, but not
illegal).
23. See O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 Col. L. Rev. 438, 445 (1902) ("Such a law
would clearly be general enough as all penal laws should be, but it is not clear that it
would be wise law or one capable of enforcement. Indeed it is quite certain that it would
have to be repealed at the next session".)
24. N. Y. Civil Rights Law, §J 50, 51 (1902).
25. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (This case involved an advertisement of the
value of life insurance, showing a shabbily dressed man, alongside of an easily recognized
likeness of the plaintiff, over the caption, "The Man Who Does Not Own Life Insurance",
plaintiff sought an injunction; the court granted it.)
26. Id. at 70.
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pudiated the reasoning of the Roberson case and gave full recogni-
ton to the existence of the right as an independent action. In 1931,
California following the Pavesich case, recognized the right, basing
its decision not on natural law, but upon the constitutional right to
pursue and obtain happiness.27
Other states have recognized the right of privacy in the absence
of statute, basing their decisions not upon the constitution or upon
natural law, but upon the common law itself. They maintain that
"The common law, with its capacity for growth and expansion and
its adaptability to the needs and requirements of changing condi-
tions, contains within itself the resources of principle upon which
relief in such a case can be founded .. ."" Another court, basing
its decision on the same reasoning, stated: "While the right always
existed, its protection is a new doctrine in the law and may be
regarded as a creation of modern common law".-'
At the present time, the basis for recognizing the right is not
uniform. There are three states that recognize the right by stat-
ute.30  In the absence of statute the right exists in twenty-one
states," and the District of Columbia,:"! based either on the theory
of natural law,' the constitution, :: or upon common law prin-
ciples.3 5  Other states, have expressly refused to recognize the
27. See Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931) (Plaintiff, an ex
prostitute, had been tried and acquited of murder. Since her acquittal, she had remained
and was living a virtuous life among people who knew nothing of her past. The defend-
.ant produced a motion picture, based on plaintiff's life history as revealed at trial. Court
held, the incidents were of public record and not actionable, however 4he use of plaintiff's
name is; and awarded damages basing its decision on § 1, Art. 1 of the California Consti-
tution. "All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protccting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness".)
28. Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 628, 113 P.2d 438 (1941).
29. Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).
30. N. Y. Civil Rights Law, §§ 50, 51 (1902) (It is limited to the use of names
and pictures for advertising); Va. Code, §§ 5782 (Michie 1942); Utah Code Ann. H
103-4-7, 103-4-9 (1943).
31. See Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948); Reed v. Real Detective
Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1915); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297
Pac. 91 (1931); Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So.2d 635 (1947); Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Eick v. Peck'Dog Food Co.,
347 I11. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952); Continental Optical Co., v. Reed, 119 Ind.
App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 76 N.W.2d
762 (Iowa 1956); Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918); Brents v. Morgan,
221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927); Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 226 La.
644, 82 So.2d 61 (1956); Palles v. Crawley, Milner & Co., 332 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d
911 (1948); Barber v. Time, 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942); Welsh v. Pritchard,
125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952); Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177
P.2d 442 (1947); Frey v. Dixon, 141 N.J.Eq. 481, 58 A.2d 86 (1948); Flake v. Greens-
boro News Co., 212 N. C. 980, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Friedman v. Cincinnati Local Joint
Executive Bd., 6 Ohio Supp. 276, 20 Ohio 473 (1941); Hinish v. Meier,& Frank Co., 166
Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941); Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 143 F. 5upp. 952 (W. D.
Fa. 1956); Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 192 S. C. 454, 75 S.E.2d 169 (1940).
32. Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
33. See Note 25 supra.
34. See Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 '(1931).
35. See Note 28 supra.
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right.16 The remaining states have not passed on the question either
because they apparently have not had the opportunity37 or be-
cause they have been able to aptly, "dodge" the issue. :'5
SCOPE OF APPLICATION
When the right of privacy is allowed, it is subject to certain ex-
ceptions:
1. The general public has the right to news and information3
0
and if a person has been the motivating force either voluntarily4"
or involuntarily" in creating the situation which leads to publicity
he cannot claim that his privacy has been invaded. Thus, a person
who becomes an actor and creates public interest automatically
(merges from his seclusion and it is permissible to publish his pho-
tograph and accounts of his activities.42 In the case of Bernstein v.
National Broadcast Co.,43 the plaintiff was the victim of erroneous
convictions and was subsequently pardoned. These incidents of his
life were highly publicized and caused him great distress. How-
ever, he was not allowed to recover for an invasion of privacy but
had to succumb to the right of the public to news, even though his
publicity was definitely involuntary on his part.
2. The right is a personal one and does not survive death. In the
case of Atkinson v. Doherty,44 the court refused the widow of
Colonel John Atkinson an injunction restraining the use of his name
and portrait on a cigar label, maintaining that any right of privacy
which Colonel Atkinson may have had during his lifetime did not
survive his death. The court was manifestly sympathetic toward
the plaintiff but stated that it is one of the ills that under the law
cannot be redressed.
3. Unnatural entities such as partnerships or corporations,"
may not maintain the action except by statute."
36. See Note 9 supra.
37. See Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, 93 A.2d 292 (1952); Kelly v.
Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951); Berg v. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (4th Div. Minn. 1948); Lewis v. Physicians Bureau, 27
Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
38. See Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d
753 (1940).
39. Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 76 N.W.2d 762, (Iowa 1956) (Iowa
recognized the right as existing, but refused to allow plaintiff to recover, because the matter
was one of legitimate public interest. Plaintiffs, parents of a deceased boy who had been
missing a month brought action against defendant for publishing photograph of mutilated
and decomposed body of the boy with news story concerning finding of body. The court
stated the incident of the finding of the missing local boy was of proper public interest.)
40. See Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal. App. 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1954).
41. See Note 39 supra; Abernathy v. Thornton, 263 Ala. 516, 83 S.2d 235 (1955).
42. Jacona v. Southern Radio and Television Co., 83 So.2d 34, (Fla. 1955).
43. 129 F. Supp. 817 (D. C. Cir. 1955).
44. 121 Mich. 373, 80 N.W. 285 (1899).
45. Rosenwasse v. Ogaglia, 172 App. Div. 107, 158 N.Y. Supp. 56 (2d Dep. 1916).
46. Utah Code Ann., if 103-4-7, 103-4-9 (1943).
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4. Creditors have certain rights to use acceptable business
methods to collect from their debtors.4 7 However, they must use
discretion in their collection methods or they too may be liable for
the invasion of privacy. 8
5. The right may not be asserted against the government when
it acts under its police power.4  It may display photographs or
fingerprintso if it is for the furtherance of law enforcement.
One court has indicated that the right of privacy is relative to
the customs of the time and place, and it is determined by. the
standards of the ordinary man. The protection afforded by the
right must be restricted to ordinary sensibilities. The act must be
of such a nature that a reasonable man can see what might and
probably will cause mental distress and injury to anyone possessed
of ordinary feelings and intelligence, if he were placed in the same
situation as the complainant."'
DEFENSES
Consent, '- once given is a bar to the action. The right may also
be lost through the doctrine of unclean hands.53 However, truth,"
mistake," motive," inadvertence,37 or lack of malice" do not con-
stitute defenses to the action.
JEROME J. MACK.
47. Note, 31 N. Dak. L. Rev. 277 (1955).
48. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
49. Voelker v. Tyndell, 226 Ind. 43, 75 N.E.2d 548 (1947).
50. See note 49 supra.
51. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243, 251 (1945) (dictum).
52. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 143 F. Supp. 952 (W. D. Pa. 1956) (Plaintiff,
through widow, agreed that a picture of family should become a part of the news item.
Repudiatior. of family picture in connection with news item three months later is not in-
vasion of privacy); see note 29 supra.
53. Western Union Tel. Co., v. McLaurin, 108 Miss. 273, 66 So. 739 (1914) (In
this case plaintiff was denied recovery for disclosure of a telegram sent him by a prostitute).
54. See note 48 supra.
55. See Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App.2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942)
(This case involved a letter addressed to plaintiff and signed by a female, which was of a
for purpose of advertising a motion picture).
nature which cast doubt on plaintiff's moral character, and was circulated by defendants
56. See note 51 supra.
57. See note 55 supra.
58. See Cason v. Bakken, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1945).
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